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Environmental Law After Katrina: Reforming
Environmental Law by Reforming
Environmental Lawmaking
Richard 1. Lazarus'
Katrina s overriding lesson for environmental law is no less than our environmental
lawmaking institutions require fimdamental refol1111Jtion. OtheIWise, the nation s tragic failure
not only to enact laws that anticipate the obvious dsks presented to the Gulf Region by
hurricanes, but perversely to increase those dsks by destroying the ecosystem natural
protections, will inevitably be repeated with even more devastating results.

s

I.

MOTHER NATURE AND THE NATURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW ............................................................................................ 1021

TI.

HUMAN NATURE AND THE NATURE OF OUR LAWMAKING
INSTITUTIONS ............................................................................. 1041

TIL

KNOWING THY ENEMY .............................................................. 1053

How do you deal with an enemy that has no govemmen~ no money
trail and no qualms about killing women and children?
The enemy is Mother Nature. And on August 29, 2005, in the form
of Hurricane Katrina, she killed 1,836 people, devastated a land area
larger than Great Britain and caused over 100 billion dollars worth of
destruction. Even when her wrath isn't as grand, she is still accountable
every year for almost 500 American deaths and 14 billion dollars worth
ofdamage.
Its time we started fighting back'

The above political advertisement originally appeared on a full
page of the New lVrk Times on August 29, 2006, the ftrst anniversary
of Hurricane Katrina's landfall on the Gulf Coast of the United States. 2

*
Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. This Article is based on a
talk I presented on Friday, October 13, 2006, at the Tulane University School of Law as part
of the Tulane Law Review Symposium, Hurricane Katrina: Reshaping the Legal Landscape
ofthe GulfSouth. I would like to thank the organizers of that Symposium for inviting me to
participate in their program. I would also like to thank James Harper, Georgetown University
Law Center Class of 2008, for his outstanding research and editorial assistance in the
preparation of this Article and Sara Colangelo, Class of 2007, for her skill in the Article's
fmal production.
1.
ProtectingAmerica.org, Advertisement, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2006, at All
(emphasis added).
2.
Seeid
1019
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It has since reappeared in a host of major newspapers and national

magazines.
The advertisement's sponsor is an Internet-based
organization with the inviting name "ProtectingAmerica.org," which
additional research quickly reveals was created by the nation's largest
insurance company, Allstate Insurance Company.3 The purpose of the
political advertisement was to generate public attention and support for
legislation pending in Congress that would create a federal reinsurance
program for national catastrophes based on the premise that private
and state insurance programs cannot possibly compensate victims of
such catastrophes for the enormous losses they suffer.4
The purpose of this Article is to explore the meaning of
environmental law in Katrina's aftermath by explaining why the
advertisement's premise is fundamentally misconceived and its policy
prescription is misdirected. Mother Nature is not our enemy, and evergreater insurance coverage is not the solution to avoiding catastrophes
such as Katrina. Indeed, the whole notion is so misguided that it
would hardly be worth a response were it not for the fact that the
advertisement reflects the very kind of misdirected thinking that
propagated, in the first instance, the tragedies witnessed during Katrina
and its aftermath. That such claims can still now be seriously
maintained is most unsettling because it suggests that not even the
catastrophic human and environmental harm caused by Katrina is
capable of promoting the wholesale rethinking of humankind's
relationship to our natural environment and our related lawmaking
institutions that Katrina should have made plain is now necessary.
This Article is divided into three parts. Part I explores, in
theoretical terms, the lessons that Katrina presents for environmental
law. This discussion describes, in particular, a better way to think: of
the relationship between Mother Nature, the laws of nature, and the
laws of humankind, including environmental law. Part II looks
forward, seeking to describe the kind of environmental law reform that
seems necessary to avoid a never-ending and tragically destructive
cycle of human and environmental catastrophes in New Orleans. A
central conclusion is that Katrina underscores the need for lawmaking
institutions that are better able to overcome the human tendency to fail
to apprehend the full spatial and temporal scope of the environmental
risks generated by modem technology. Finally, Part ill of the Article
returns briefly to the political advertisement in the New York Times.
3.
Rebecca Mowbray, Conflict Brews over Cnsis Funds, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New
Orleans), Nov. 20, 2006, at A-I.
4.
See H.R. 4366, 109th Congo § 2 (2005).
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MOTHER NATURE AND THE NATURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

"The enemy is Mother Nature.',s
Mother Nature is not humankind's enemy. Nor is Mother Nature
invariably our friend. Like the laws of nature that defme our physical
universe, Mother Nature simply "is." It makes no more sense to say
that Mother Nature is our enemy than to posit that either gravitational
or electromagnetic forces are our enemy, or the speed of light or sound,
or the first or second laws of thermodynamics.
Indeed, that is modem environmental protection law's central
tenet. The laws we choose to govern ourselves must account for the
laws of nature and work within them, both respecting the limits they
defme and taking advantage of the bounty of opportunities they offer.
But our laws cannot defy the laws of nature. Or, more to the point, the
laws of humankind cannot define the laws of nature away the same
way that a law can defme and redefme what constitutes a
"corporation," "contract," or "burglary." The latter are all inventions of
the law itself and, therefore, entirely susceptible to modification by
legal amendment at any time.
But our laws cannot modify
gravitational or electromagnetic forces, the speed of light or sound, or
the laws of thermodynamics. They cannot change the periodic table of
chemical elements by asserting that hydrogen or any other element has
a different atomic weight, electron configuration, boiling or melting
point, solubility, or reactivity than it in fact has. They cannot modify
the "ideal gas law," "Avogadro's number," the process of
photosynthesis in plants, or the workings of the metabolic pathways
critical to respiration in living cells.
Effective environmental law accepts the laws of nature as a given,
fashioning legal rules that regulate human activity as necessary to
achieve environmental protection and resource conservation
objectives. The Clean Air Act must account for the chemical reactions
in the combustion process of fossil fuels both by considering the
pollutants that may therein be generated and by enlisting some of those
same chemical reactive properties in devising regulatory methods to
reduce the pollution.6 The Act must similarly account for the workings
of the atmosphere, including the potential for short and longer range

5.
ProtectingAmerica.org, supra note I.
6.
See Clean Air Act, 42 US.c. § 7411 (2000) (stating some of the regulatory
methods that a state must implement in order to be in compliance with the Clean Air Act).
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transport under different climatic and seasonal conditions.' To achieve
its water quality goals, the Clean Water Act of 1977 cannot ignore the
impact of wetlands development on traditional navigable water
bodies;8 the ways in which hydroelectric facilities can change water
quality without the formal introduction of pollutants from outside the
water body;9 or the potential for certain kinds of water pollutants to
pass through untreated or to interfere with the operation of publicly
owned treatment works. lo So, too, the United States Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), in implementing the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act of 1976, takes care to define the meaning of "solid
waste" in a manner that reflects the ability of virtually any chemical
compound to serve a beneficial purpose based on its mass, adhesive
quality, or combustibility. II Accordingly, the EPA's hazardous waste
management program does not automatically exclude from regulation
hazardous materials generated as by-products from industrial or
manufacturing processes just because those materials could be used as
"ballast" on boats or as "fill" in building materials, spread on roads for
"dust suppression," or burned as "fuel.,,12
Environmental law eschews such fictions because of the truly
tragic and catastrophic consequences that can otherwise result. The
ozone layer in the upper atmosphere can be destroyed if environmental
law ignores how emissions of certain chemical compounds interact
with others to break apart, in effect, the three oxygen atoms that
combine to form the ozone molecule, which provides a protective layer
in the stratosphere shielding the earth's surface from excessive
ultraviolet rays from the sun. 13 Certain pollutants discharged from
industrial facilities can literally blow up when introduced into sewage
systems and publicly owned treatment works. 14 Dams can effectively
destroy entire aquatic ecosystems by capturing the energy flow value
7.
See 42 u.S.C. §§ 7403(c)(1), (e)(3), (f)(2), 7506a, 7511c; Clean Air Interstate
Rule, 40 C.ER. pts. 51, 72-78, 96 (2006).
8.
See Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2000); Rapanos v. United
States, 126 S. Ct. 2208,2226-27 (2006).
See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1341,1362(16); S.D. Warren Co. v. Me. Bd. ofEnvtl. Prot., 126
9.
S. Ct. 1843, 1852-53 (2006).
10. See33 U.S.c. § 1317(b).
11. See 40 C.ER. §§ 261.1-.4 (2006); see also Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580,90 Stat. 2795.
12. See40 C.ER. §§ 260-266.
13. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE,
AND POLICY 1046-49 (4th ed. 2003).
14. See Winston Williams, Louisvilles Cleanup Begins in Wake ofSewer Explosion,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1981, (Special), atAl2.
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of a water body and turning a flowing waterway into a still body of
water. IS And, if dioxin-contaminated oil by-product of industrial
processes escapes federal hazardous waste management by being
spread on a town's roads for "dust suppression," and therefore is not
considered the discarding of "waste" subject to regulation, it can
effectively destroy and force the evacuation of the entire town. 16
Hurricane Katrina provides, however, the most chilling testimony
to what happens when the laws of nature are fictionalized in the laws
of humankind. In Louisiana alone, at least 1464 people are known to
have died as a result of the storm and another 135 are still missing
more than a year later. 17 These individuals are not some isolated data
points. They were people with passions and aspirations, with loved
ones, children, parents, siblings, and personal and professional
communities. Each death caused waves of sorrow, despair, and misery
for the many with whom the deceased was close and great sadness
even among those who were complete strangers to the victim, yet
witnesses, through the media, to their suffering.
The loss of life resulting from Katrina, which was heavily
concentrated in Louisiana, and in New Orleans in particular, is the
most tragic of what Michael Chertoff, Homeland Security Secretary,
described as "probably the worst catastrophe or set of catastrophes" in
the nation's history.ls Katrina resulted in serious physical and mental
injuries to tens of thousands of persons. 19 Millions became refugees
from their homes for not days or weeks, but at least months and, for
many, as a practical matter, permanently.20 The total estimated damage
is more than eighty billion dollars. 21 This number is likely a small

15. See JOOINDER BHUTAN!, U.S. ENVTL. PRaT. AGENCY, IMPACT OF HYDROLOOIC
MODIFICATIONS ON WATER QUALITY 41-43 (1975); U.S. ENVTL. PRaT. AGENCY, REPOIIT TO
CONGRESS: DAM WATER QUALITY STUDY 2-9 (1989).
16. See Robert Reinhold, Us. Offers To Buy All Homes in ToWIJ Tainted by Dioxin,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23,1983, (Special), at AI.
17. See LA. FAMILY AsSISTANCE CTR., REUNITING THE FAMILIES OF KATRINA AND RITA
4-5 (2006), available at http://www.dhh.louisiana.gov/officeslpublicationsipubs-303IFull%
20Report.pdf.
18. Press Conference, Michael Chertoff, Homeland Sec. Sec'y (Sept. 3, 2005).
19. See Gary Younge, Gone with the Win~ GUARDIAN (London), July 29, 2006,
(Weekend), at 18.
20. See MANUEL PASTOR ET AL., IN THE WAKE OF THE STORM: ENVIRONMENT,
DISASTER, AND RACE AFTER KATRINA 4 (2006).
21.
Kenneth Chang, In Study, A History Lesson on the Costs of Hurricanes, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 11, 2005, § 1, at 52.
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fraction of the true total human and environmental cost of the
22
overwhelming. destruction and disruption of lives and ecosystems.
As levee after levee in New Orleans breached, 80% of the city
Hundreds of thousands lost their homes and their
flooded. 23
livelihoods, communities, daily life, and peace of mind. Almost
40,000 sought refuge in the Louisiana Superdome and Convention
Center, which was supposed to be a sanctuary, but where instead
thirty-four died, and none had adequate food, water, power, or
sanitation.24 Day after day after day, the nation witnessed their
wrenching misery on national television. The public reeled from the
inexplicable absence of any meaningful governmental effort to
alleviate the enormous ongoing suffering, occurring in real time not in
some far away part of the globe, but here in the United States in one of
the nation's major cities and at the precise location where they had
been told to go for reliees
22.
Younge, supra note 19, at 19 (describing the physical and cultural devastation of
the City of New Orleans, including the halving ofits popUlation and the dramatic increases in
mental illness in geneml and depression and suicide in particular).
23.
Trymaine Lee, Disaster Practice Takes to the l-Witer, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New
Orleans), Sept. 21,2006, at A-I.
24.
See Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and
Balance in the Inteljurisdictional Gray Area, 66 MD. L. REv. (forthcoming Apr. 2007)
(manuscript at 17). Despite knowing the likelihood of a hurricane and subsequent flooding,
local, state, and fedeml governments did little to plan for New Orleans' evacuation. For
example, New Orleans' buses remained in their parking lots, flooded after the hurricane,
because, according to New Orleans' Mayor, Ray Nagin, the city did not have enough drivers.
See IVOR VAN HEERDEN & MIKE BRYAN, THE SroRM 61-62 (2006). In Jefferson Parish, the
Emergency Preparedness Director publicly acknowledged before the hurricane that, even
with shelters of last resort in place, five to ten percent of individuals who did not evacuate
See MEMBER SCHOLARS FOR THE CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, AN
would die.
UNNATIJRAL DISASTER: THE AFTERMATH OF HURRICANE KATRINA EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2425 (2005) (quoting Bruce Nolan, In Stonn, N.D. Wants" No One Lefl Behind, TIMESPICAYUNE (New Orleans), July 24, 2005, at B-1). The state government fared no better. The
State Department of Transportation and Development Secretary, Johnny Bmdberry, was
chastised at a Senate con:unittee hearing in February 2006 because his agency had been
tasked in April 2005 to develop evacuation plans for at-risk populations, but it had failed to
do so. See VAN HEERDEN & BRYAN, supra, at 62-63. The Fedeml Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA), too, knew of the inadequacy of evacuation plans, and, after President Bush
declared a national emergency on Saturday, August 27, invoking the Stafford Act, the
evacuation became a fedeml responsibility. See id at 64-65. A New lVrk Times study,
however, contests the proposition that hurricane victims were unable to escape New Orleans
because of a lack of transportation. Shaila Dewan & Janet Roberts, Louisiana Deadly
Stonn Took Strong as Ui-ll as the Helpless, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2005, at AI.
25.
Some commentators have suggested that the failure of an adequate response is
due, at least in part, to fedemlism concerns. Professor Erin Ryan suggests that a rigid view of
fedemlism pamlyzed the hurricane response by requiring that state authorities make specific
requests for hurricane assistance, which led to an "opemting system cmsh." Ryan, supra note
24, at II.

s
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The environmental consequences were likewise devastating. The
force of the floodwaters ripped through neighborhoods, commercial
and industrial areas, and environmentally fragile lands and waters. The
waters invariably picked up and spread toxic contaminants throughout
their reach. 26 Katrina created approximately twenty-two million tons of
debris, half of which remains in Orleans Parish, and forty-two
thousand tons of hazardous waste. 27 The sediment contains significant
concentrations of arsenic, lead, and chemical carcinogens such as
diesel fue1. 28 Hundreds of thousands of homes will need to be
destroyed in the cleanup effort.29
Katrina's wind and waters also significantly altered ecosystems.
Barrier islands off the coast of Louisiana serve as natural buffers from
hurricanes and storm surges and provide a significant habitat for
wildlife, including sea turtles, marine mammals, and fish.30 Just in
Breton Sound, off Louisiana, Katrina converted approximately thirty
square miles of marsh to open water. 3) Sixteen wildlife refuges closed
due to damage. 32 Floodwaters contaminated with raw sewage,
pesticides, heavy metal, and toxic pollutants were pumped into Lake
Pontchartrain, near New Orleans, to relieve flooding, causing great
damage to that water body and to the plant and wildlife dependent
upon ie3
The precise long- and short-term environmental
consequences are not clear, but their enormous significance is not
disputed.
Putting to one side, for the moment, the extraordinary breakdown
of government relief efforts in Katrina's aftermath, none of these
environmental consequences was unforeseeable or even unforeseen.
Yet the government consciously ignored basic laws of nature. The City
of New Orleans is centered in a natural bowl-graphically described
as a fragile saucer floating in a pool of water-into which water will

26.
at 17-18.
27.

28.

See MEMBER SCHOLARS FOR THE CrR.. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, supra note 24,
SeePASTORET AL.,

supra note 20, at 29.

See

GINA M. SOLOMON & MIRIAM ROTKIN-ELLMAN, NATURAL REs. DEF.
COUNCIL, CONTAMINANTS IN NEW ORLEANS SEDIMENT 3 (2006), available athttp://www.nrdc.

orglhealth1effectslkatrinadatalsedimentepa.pdf.
29. See PASTOR ET AL., supra note 20, at 29.

30. See PERVAZE A. SHEIKH, THE IMPACf OF HURRICANE KATRINA ON BIOLOGICAL
RESOURCES 2 (2005), available athttp://www.opencrs.com/rptsIRL33117_20051 0 18.pdf.
31.
32.
33.

See id. at 2-3.
Id. at 3.
See id. at 5-6; Andrew Gumbel & Rupert Cornwell, The Toxic Timebomb,

INDEPENDENT (London), Sept. 7, 2005, at

I.
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naturally flow and is in fact constantly flowing.34 The city lies just off
the Gulf Coast, falling in the natural pathway for severe stonns,
including a predictable number of severe hurricanes. The geography is
not complicated, nor is the related movement of water. The potential
for catastrophe has long been a given. As one commentator aptly put
it, the laws of nature are akin to a physical equation, a complex
equation to be sure, but the result it yields is fairly predictable.35 Just
plug in the numbers and it is clear where the water will flow. This is
not quantum mechanics, requiring a leap of theoretical faith to sustain
a prediction of cause and effect. This is plain old-fashioned
Newtonian mechanics that well explains the causes and effects
underlying physical phenomena visible in our daily lives.
Yet, laws regulating the settlement of the metropolitan area and
its modem development have ignored the clear import of the laws of
nature in their application to the Gulf Coast, including New Orleans.
They have exacerbated, rather than embraced, any serious effort to
minimize that catastrophic potentia1. 36 The ability of the natural
ecosystem to serve as a buffer or shield to reduce the hazards has been
inexorably undermined rather than preserved, let alone reinforced.
Historically, the Mississippi River delivered as much as 400
million tons of sediment to the Mississippi Delta, sediment that
naturally slowed the encroachment of the ocean on the coase7 This
sediment creates new land as it is deposited onto Louisiana's coases
Man-made barriers cut off that supply by 70%.39 In its absence, the
remaining land mass has literally been sinking.40 But that is just the
beginning of the ecologically perverse behavior. Thousands of miles
34.
35.

DoUGLAS BRINKLEY, THE GREAT DELUGE 13 (2006).
Bill McKibben, ~ar One ofthe Next Earth, in IN KATRINA'S WAKE: PORTRAITS
OF Loss FROM AN UNNATURAL DISASTER 9, 9 (2006).
36. See generally Raymond 1. Burby, Hurricane Katrina and the Paradoxes of
Government Disaster Policy: Bringing About u-1se Governmental DecIsions fOr Hazardous
Areas; 604 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 171 (2006) (discussing the repercussions of
short-sighted governmental disaster policy).
37.
See BRINKLEY, supra note 34, at 9; Oliver Houck, Can l* Save New Orleans?, 19
TuL. ENVTL. L.1. 1,58-59 (2006).
38.
See VAN HEERDEN & BRYAN, supra note 24, at 160; Erin Ryan, New Orleans, the
Chesapeake, and the Future of Environmental Assessment" Overcoming the Natural
Resources Law ofUnintended Consequences, 40 U. RICH. L. REv. 981, 992 (2005).
39. See VAN HEERDEN & BRYAN, supra note 24, at 281-82. The Flood Control Act of
1928, 33 U.S.c. § 702a-m (2000), authorized numerous flood control projects that have
cumulatively resulted in the boxing in of the Mississippi River. Oliver A. Houck, Land Loss
in Coastal Louisiana: Causes, Consequences, and Remedies, 58 TuL. L. REv. 3, 19 & n.60
(1983). Construction of many of the levees on the river was primarily motivated by
commercial, not flood-control, purposes. Id at 19.
40.
See Houck, supra note 37, at4.
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of canals and pipelines were constructed, increasing erosion and
promoting destructive saltwater intrusion into marshlands. 41 Wetlands
behind the levees became prime targets for economic development,
rather than for use as natural floodways.42
In southern Louisiana alone, one million acres of wetlands
reportedly disappeared between 1930 and 2005, and when Katrina
struck, the state's rate of wetland loss had reached the size of a football
field every thirty-eight minutes.43 The steady and consistent sinking of
the remaining land mass further deepens the potential for flooding and
both human and environmental devastation. 44 With the loss, moreover,
of the ability of wetlands and natural floodways to absorb floodwaters,
more and more water is being squeezed into less and less space.45 Here
too, the physical equation generated by the laws of nature and the
limits of human engineering makes plain the inevitable result:
powerful, concentrated floodwaters capable of breaking down levees.
Not only have the most flood-threatened areas seen development,
rather than preservation, but this development has promised to increase
dramatically the harm likely to result. Little or no effort has been
made to have land uses more compatible or less threatened by the
flood potential. Instead, threatened areas have become the sites of
chemical and petroleum industries, thereby ensuring that, when
46
Other
flooded, the waters will be contaminated by pollutants.
threatened areas have experienced residential development, often as
homes for the poor, the elderly, and racial minorities who lack the
economic, physical, and political resources necessary for effective
evacuation when catastrophe hits. 47
41. Id at 18; Ryan, supra note 38, at 995 & n.70. Development by the oil and gas
industry is also cited as a primary cause of wetlands loss. VAN HEERDEN & BRYAN, supra note
24, at 164; Houck, supra note 37, at 18. Coastal Louisiana has "10 major navigation canals
and 14,973 km (9,300 rni) of pipelines ... servicing approximately 50,000 oil and gas
production facilities." NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, DRAWING LOUISIANA'S NEW MAP:
ADDRESSING LAND Loss IN COASTAL LOUISIANA 36 (2006). Oil and gas activities have
caused at least 50%, and in some areas up to 90%, of the land loss in Louisiana. Houck,
supra note 37, at 18.
42.
See Burby, supra note 36, at 175-76; Houck, supra note 37, at 45.
43. See BRINKLEY, supra note 34, at 9. Much of this loss directly resulted from
human development. The Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (MR-GO), a shipping canal from
New Orleans to the Gulf of Mexico, is a prime example. The canal is now three to four times
wider than its initial size because of erosion, and this has damaged and ruined contiguous
marshlands. VAN HEERDEN & BRYAN, supra note 24, at 79.
44.
See BRINKLEY, supra note 34, at 12-13; Ryan, supra note 38, at 994.
45. See Houck, supra note 37, at 9-11.
46.
See PASTOR ET AL., supra note 20, at 29.
47.
See BROOKlNGS INST., NEW ORLEANS AFTER THE SWRM: LESSONS FROM THE
PAST, A PLAN FOR THE FUTURE 13-14 (2005), available at http://www.brookings.edulmetro/
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Here too, Katrina confirms the worst. Areas damaged by the
hurricane were 45.8% African American, while undamaged areas were
26.4% African American. 48 The poor were likewise disproportionately
affected; 20.9% of households in damaged areas had income below the
poverty line, while only 15.3% of households in undamaged areas
were below the poverty line.49 And, 45.7% of households in damaged
areas had residents who were renters, compared to 30.9% in
communities that were relatively undamaged. 50 The effect is magnified
within New Orleans, where households in damaged areas were 75%
African American and undamaged areas were 46.2% African
American. 51 In the western United States, water is typically said to
flow to money. 52 When it comes to flooding in the Gulf Coast and
New Orleans, by contrast, water is more accurately described as
flowing '" aWclyfrom money. ",53 African Americans and poor residents
tend to live in hydrologically lower areas of New Orleans, while
wealthier white residents live in higher elevations that experience less
flooding. 54 Katrina forced the closing of all of the public housing in
New Orleans, which is primarily inhabited by minorities and the poor.55

pubs/20051012_NewOrleans.pdf. The federal government has encouraged this development
by adopting the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, 42 U.S.c. §§ 4001-4127 (2000). See
Burby, supra note 36, at 175. Likewise, federal housing policy has led to concentrated
poverty in the most vulnerable areas of New Orleans. BROOKINGS INST., supra, at 21.
48.
See JOHN R. LOGAN, THE IMPACT OF KATRINA: RACE AND CLASS IN STORMDAMAGED NEIGHBORHOODS 7 (2006), available at http://www.s4.brown.edulKatrina/report.
pdf. Aside from Katrina's disparate statistical impact, particularly telling of the racial divide
exposed by Katrina, a recent study indicates that Katrina victims' view of hurricane response
corresponds strongly to race. Cedric Herring, Hurricane Katrina and the Racial Gulf, 3 Du
BOIS REv. 129, 129-44 (2006). African-American victims (75%) are more likely than white
victims (24%) to believe that the government's response to the disaster would have been
faster had most victims been white. Id at 136. African-American victims (79%) are also
more likely than white victims (48%) to believe that Katrina unearthed existing inequalities.

Id
49.

50.
51.
52.

See LOGAN, supra note 48, at 7.
Id
Id
Jason DeParle, U1Iat Happens to a Race Deferred, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2005, § 4,

at l.

53. Id (quoting Craig E. Colten, Louisiana State University geologist (emphasis
added)).
54. BROOKINGS INST., supra note 47, at 13.
55. LOGAN, supra note 48, at 14-15. Louisiana Congressman Richard Baker was
quoted in the Wall Street Joumal as saying, '''We fmally cleaned up public housing in New
Orleans. We couldn't do it, but God did.'" VAN HEERDEN & BRYAN, supra note 24, at 131
(quoting John Harwood, Washington Wire: Louisiana Lawmakers Aim To Cope with
Political Fallout, WALL ST. 1., Sept. 9, 2005, at A4). Congressman Baker responded to the
news article by asserting he was misquoted. Id
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Katrina did not spare all people who do not belong to a racial
minority or who are not poor. While many of the poorest
neighborhoods are among the most threatened by floods, the aesthetic
lure of proximity to water in places like suburban New Orleans led to
the destruction of some of the most expensive homes. 56 In the suburbs,
damaged areas were 9.1 % African American and undamaged areas
were 25.2% African American. 57
Race also played less of a role in New Orleans for two additional
reasons. Many of the newer developments and, frequently, more
expensive developments, were located in lower-lying areas for the
simple reason that those were the lands still left for developmene8 The
higher areas were, naturally, the fIrst to be developed. In addition,
much of the most severe damage depended on the precise location of
the breach of the levees. And the breaches occurred in the weakest
part of the levees, often where the levee construction had been the
poorest, with no apparent relationship to the socioeconomic character
of the bordering neighborhood. 59 Similarly, in the Biloxi-Gulfport
metropolitan region, households in damaged areas were 14.8% African
American and undamaged areas were 20.4% African American. 60 The
trends for poverty rates in damaged and undamaged areas in the
suburbs were similar.61 The percentages differed outside the New
Orleans region, in part, apparently because the most desirable and
expensive property along the coast is near the coastline, which was
most damaged by wind and storm surge.62
Without a doubt, however, the sick and the elderly were among
those who suffered the most, simply because of their sheer inability to
rescue themselves in anticipation of the storm or in its immediate
aftermath. While some dispute exists as to whether Katrina's death toll
reveals a racial divide,63 no one disputes that those who lost their lives
56. LOGAN, supra note 48, at 8.
57. Id at 7.
58. BROOKINGS INST., supmnote 47, at 10-11.
59. See LoGAN, supra note 48, at 1,8.
60.
Id at 7.
61.
Seeid
62. Id at 8; see DAVID M. BUSH ET AL., LIVING BY THE RULES OF THE SEA 4-5 (1996)
(explaining population migration to dangerous coastal locations).
63. See, e.g., Cathy Young, Op-Ed, Katrina s Racial Paranoia, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan.
16,2006, at A13 (arguing that age was a more important factor than race in determining the
likelihood of a person to fall victim to Katrina). Given the degree of suffering in the
aftermath of Katrina, including in black communities, and the history of racism both in the
area in general and related to flooding in particular, see, for example, JOHN M. BARRY, RIsING
TIDE: THE GREAT MIssISSIPPI FLOOD OF 1927 AND How IT CHANGED AMERICA 315-17, 328-
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were disproportionately elderly and poor. 64 Persons sixty years and
older represented approximately 15% of the population of New
Orleans, but almost three quarters of those who died. 65 The vast
majority apparently died not during the height of the storm itself, but
instead during the flooding and institutional chaos that followed on its
heels, in many places literally for days afterwards. They drowned in
attics during the flooding, died from illnesses that went untreated, and
died sometimes moments before, and even after, rescue efforts tmally
reached them. 66
The laws of nature unleashed the hurricane level winds within
Katrina, but the disaster did not result from Mother Nature alone. We
must examine ourselves and herein lies Katrina's most unsettling
aspect of all. As described above, there was nothing unanticipated
about the human and environmental catastrophe that resulted from
Katrina. Government officials, scientists, and environmentalists have
predicted for years just such adverse consequences.67 It has always
been a question of precisely when, and never whether, a hurricane
would wreak destruction upon New Orleans and the Gulf Coast under
existing conditions. The degree of threat caused by wetlands
destruction and the pattern of land development was undisputed and
thoroughly documented. 68 No one who had ever conducted more than
the most superficial examination of the potential problems thought that
the levees could withstand a major hurricane. Katrina's only true
surprise was that the levees were even more vulnerable than
anticipated and, as a result, broke in the wake of lower winds and
waters.69
There have been legions of scientific and engineering studies
describing the physical parameters of the threats and the weaknesses of
30 (1997), where the author's simple suggestion of "racial paranoia" is, at the very least,
misplaced.
See Tim Wise, Op-Ed, "Eracing' Katrina: Histoncal Revisiomsm and the Dem"al
64.
ofthe Obvious, CIv. RTS. COALITION FOR 21 ST CENTURY, July 25,2006, http://www.civilrights.
orglpress_roomlbuzz_clipslop-ed-eracing-katrina-historical-revisionism-and-the-denial-ofthe-obvious.html. For a breakdown of storm-related deaths by age and race as of February
23, 2006, see LA. DEP'T OF HEALTH & Hosps., VITAL STATISTICS OF ALL BODIES AT ST.
GABRIEL MORGUE (2006), available at htlp://www.dhh.louisiana.gov/officeslpublications/
pubs-I 92IDeceased%20Victims_2-23-2006_information. pdf.
65.
SeeYoung, supra note 63.
66.
See Dewan & Roberts, supra note 24.
67.
See VAN HEERDEN & BRYAN, supra note 24, at I
See Houck, supra note 37, at 9-11.
68.
69.
See Michael Grunwald, Katrina: The Big One or Just a Warning Shot?, WASH.
POST, Mar. 26, 2006, at Bl ("[W]eather data suggest[s] that Katrina's winds were no stronger
than Category 2 when they hit New Orleans, and possibly just Category I.").
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existing approaches. 70 They described in detail and, in retrospect, fairly
accurately, the extent and intensity of destruction likely to occur. 71 Nor
were any of the results of these studies hidden from public
consumption, filed away in some academic's office or government
bureaucrat's file; it had been widely disseminated in the hallways of
lawmakers and in the general news media.72 Newspaper and magazine
stories in national and regional publications left no doubt about the
stakes in terms of human health and welfare and the natural
environment. 73 Television specials and news radio stories laid out, in
detail, the threats that hurricanes posed to the Gulf Coast and New
Orleans in particular. 74
Indeed, even the most cursory review of those scientific and
government studies, environmental organization reports, and news
media stories is chilling in light of what has happened.
In
summarizing scientific affidavits filed in support of standing
allegations in Massachusetts v. EPA, no less than the United States
Supreme Court itself characterized as "eerily prescient" the extent to
which scientists in 2004 described both the possible impact of climate
change on hurricane strength and the special threats posed to New
Orleans because of the destruction of wetlands that could have
otherwise served as a "'shock absorber'" for the city's protection. 75
Disaster was well forecast with years of warning, yet little was
done, in fact, to reduce its potential. 76 Even worse, public and private
conduct not only failed to alleviate the associated risks, but instead
increased them. 77 A disturbing cognitive dissonance, with obvious
tragic consequences, persisted between what everyone knew to be the
case, how government chose to govern, and how everyone chose to
live their lives. 78
70.
71.

See VAN HEERDEN & BRYAN, supra note 24, at 205-09.
Seeid
72. Seeid
73.
See BRINKLEY, supra note 34, at 14.
74.
See Houck, supra note 37, at 2-3.
75. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1456 n.l8 (2007) (quoting the declaration
of Michael MacCracken, Former Executive Dir., U.S. Global Change Research Program).
76. History and computer models made clear that the levees protecting New Orleans
and surrounding areas would be insufficient to provide protection from a slow-moving major
hurricane. See VAN HEERDEN & BRYAN, supra note 24, at 79.
77. One commentator suggests that the federal and state policies that exacerbated
hurricane damage form part of a larger federal policy to make dangerous areas livable by
subsidizing development. Burby, supra note 36, at 171, 173-78.
78. Cognitive psychology suggests that people are more likely to undervalue
nontrivial risk associated with an ongoing, valued activity. See Roger G. Noll & James E.
Krier, Some Implications ofCognitive Psychology for Risk Regulation, in BEHAVIORAL LAW
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The depth of the breakdown is so deep, pervasive, and
longstanding that it is both unfair and ultimately misleading to assign
blame to any particular political party or government official. This
was not a breakdown prompted by the chaos of the moment. No one
government official, nor one political party, is responsible. 79 The
forces that realized their catastrophic potential have long been in the
making and clearly discernible.
Nor can one validly separate the failures of the government in
addressing the plight of Katrina's victims from the failure of the
government to take the actions necessary to reduce the risk of harm
from hurricanes in the first instance. The federal, state, and local
governments' dismal record in addressing the enormous needs of
Katrina's victims immediately after the storm is simply one more
expression of the far more malignant problem presented by the failure
of the government, and the governed, to pay any meaningful heed to
threats posed by hurricanes. In light of the complete absence of any
effort to minimize that threat-by instead eliminating wetlands,
building canals that promoted further land loss, and locating
inappropriate industrial plants and residential developments in floodprone areas-it can hardly seem surprising that government officials
were not ready for the storm when it actually hit. Any government
with the capacity to develop a plan for victims would have had the
capacity to reduce the threat in the first instance. And, conversely, any
government with the incapacity to reduce the threat in the first instance
would likewise be expected to lack the capacity to attend to the
victims.
No doubt it would be perversely reassuring to conclude that just a
few discrete individuals or organizations were the source of
government's failing to plan for Katrina and, once it happened, to
attend to its victims in an efficient and expeditious manner. The
solution would then be easy: just personnel changes would be
required, not wholesale rethinking of existing approaches.
The problem, however, is far more endemic and far more
intractable than mere personality. Literally generations of federal,
state, and local officials, as well as business leaders, have pursued
policies seemingly doomed to fail in light of the physical realities of

325, 337 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000). This may suggest why many
Louisianans (at least political leaders) were content with their way of life, even if it exposed
them to potentially catastrophic risks.
79.
See generally BRINKLEY, supra note 34.

AND ECONOMICS
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the region. 80 What Katrina therefore strongly suggests is that,
especially in light of modem technological innovation, humankind's
physical reach simply exceeds its ready mental grasp or political
planning potential.
How else can one explain the nation's lemming-like approach to
the kind of environmental catastrophe just witnessed in Katrina, which
is simply the latest iteration of a more-than-century old story of de jure
ignorance of the Mississippi Delta's ecology? Just as it was before the
Flood of 1927, the information was available concerning the risks
presented. 81 There was little mystery about the hydrology of the
Mississippi Delta and its surrounding area, including New Orleans.
Nor was there any mystery about the implications of that hydrology
when combined with the kinds of hurricanes that routinely present
themselves in that part of the world. Katrina was not the equivalent of
a meteor hitting the earth's surface, an event whose precise location
eludes our predictive abilities. This was a hurricane landing precisely
where it was expected to land. The precise timing may not be known
years in advance, but the odds against its happening at a precise
location over a relatively discrete period of time are not great. With
existing patterns of land development, New Orleans has long been
living on borrowed time. Our own contributions to global warming
have apparently shortened that time horizon.
Yet, we did worse than nothing in the face of specific and
growing notice and past tragedies. We exacerbated the already-present
circumstances by not just ignoring nature's limits, but also by
eradicating the protections and opportunities that nature supplied. We
have systematically wiped out, rather than bolstered, the area's natural
abilities to face down or at least lessen the forces of a storm. Levees
are technologically limited in their ability to face a wall of rushing
water, which invariably finds a point of vulnerability. Miles of
wetlands and coastal marsh, however, can simply absorb the impace2
We nonetheless took a house of bricks supplied by nature and replaced
it with a house of straw built by humankind. And we placed within

80. The levees-only policy, which supports the systematic closing of the Mississippi
River's natural outlets and thereby increases the pressure on the levees, has been the
government's dominant policy for decades. See BARRY, supra note 63, at 156-60.
81.
See id
82.
See LA. COASTAL WETLANDS CONSERVATION & RESTORATION TASK FORCE &
WETLANDS CONSERVATION & RESTORATION AUTH., COAST 2050: TOWARD A SUSTAINABLE
COASTAL LOUISIANA 55-56 (1998), available at http://www.lca.gov/net-IJrod_download/
public/lca_net_pub-IJroducts/doc/2050report.pdf.
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that house some of our most vulnerable: the poor, elderly, and
politically powerless.
Nor can we lay claim to some overriding essential purpose. No
compelling governmental or societal interest justified this conduct. No
"Sophie's Choice" required a tragic choice between two competing
evils. At its best, the cause was blind indifference prompted by a
desire to better our lives in the short term. Or at its worst, the driving
force was a knowing and reckless disregard of the risks to others, a
willingness to plunder the lives of fellow citizens, and the aspirations
of future generations, other species, and the natural environment, all
motivated by a simple desire to maximize economic profits in the
short term.
Nor was government a mere passive observer. The current
absence of meaningful effort to address the threat of global climate
change can be characterized fairly as inaction, even as it becomes
increasingly clear how misguided such inaction is. But, with regard to
the threats presented in the Delta, government was instead, for the
most part, a willing participant and promoter. Largely at the direct and
indirect behest of powerful economic interests, the government itself
planned and constructed the levees and canals that destroyed the thenexisting ecosystem's ability to reduce the hazards created by storms
and created a dangerous illusion of protection.83 The government
permitted the filling-in of wetlands to allow for development where
nature supplied wetlands and coastal marshes: for-profit construction
of industry, shopping centers, and residential housing. 84
Whether dubbed conscious, outrageous conduct or blind,
subconscious indifference, human nature proved itself incapable of an
effective response. Responding to threats like Katrina (or global
climate change) requires short-term sacrifice for the possibility of
long-term gain or lack of injury.85 Once humankind is capable, as it
now is, of possessing the technological ability to transform existing
ecosystems, it needs also to possess the wisdom and judgment to stay
its hand, notwithstanding the enormous economic pressures that favor
the former over the latter. The here and now must take what appears to
be an immediate economic hit, in other words, for the benefit of the
there and then.
Katrina is strong testimony, however, that one cannot blithely rely
on human nature to do this. The laws of nature, in short, may make
83.
84.
85.

See Houck, supra note 37, at 12-17.
Seeidat 14-17.
See id at 28.
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clear that such short-tenn action is required in order to redress longtenn catastrophic consequences that will otherwise occur, but human
nature will undercut rather than promote that necessary action. Nature
works within one time and spatial framework, while human nature
works within an entirely different, far less reaching one.
Human beings naturally discount the temporally and physically
distant because of the apparent lack of direct relevancy to their own
86
With regard to time, cognitive psychology describes this
lives.
phenomenon as an "intertemporal" or "presentist" bias that prompts a
tendency to discount future risks and rewards more heavily than is
rationally warranted.87 Accordingly, people disproportionately favor
present consumption over deferred gratification.88 Cognitive studies of
human psychology suggest that humans similarly exhibit a discounting
bias against consequences that are more physically distane9
Neurological studies even suggest that physical remoteness influences
the way we think, and therefore the moral intuitions we develop,
concerning the duty to rescue. 90 The resulting differences in moral
intuition can explain in part why people will commit enonnous
personal resources to save a drowning child that is a complete stranger
or even a sympathetic animal nearby, but not commit a fraction of
those resources to save literally thousands of children in a seemingly
far away land.91
Cognitive psychology traces these tendencies, or biases, to the
notion that the human brain necessarily has a limited capacity to
process infonnation.92 The brain responds by designing certain mental
shortcuts (heuristics) that allow for quick processing of infonnation
and decisions. 93 The brain also develops its own organizing principles
86. See RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE 118-19 (2004).
Behavioral research is not a new phenomenon, but it was, until recently, largely ignored by
the legal community. See Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and
Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REv. 1499, 150607 (1998).
See Langevoort, supra note 86, at 1505.
87.
Seeid
88.
See J.D. Trout, Patemalism and Cognitive Bias, 24 LAW & PHIL. 393, 393-95
89.
(2005).
90. See Joshua Greene, The Secret Joke ofKant's Soul, in 3 MORAL PSYCHOLOGY:
THE NEUROSCIENCE OF MORALITY: EMOTION, BRAIN DISORDERS, AND DEVELOPMENT 16-17
(Walter Sinnott-Armstrong ed., forthcoming Jan. 2008).
91. See id
92. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal
Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 549, 555 (2002).
93. See id; Noll & Krier, supra note 78, at 327. One particularly relevant heuristic is
the "availability heuristic," which posits that humans take risks more seriously if the risks are
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(schema) for distinguishing between information that is more, rather
than less, relevant. 94 While such shortcuts and principles allow people
to sort through massive amounts of information quickly and make
equally quick decisions, cognitive psychologists also contend that they
can promote systematic errors by skewing judgment unduly in favor of
some outcomes at the expense of other, arguably more rational,
outcomes. 95
Four decades ago, the celebrated economist Kenneth Boulding
worried about the implications of such human tendencies for
environmental protection, if not planetary survival. In his 1966 essay,
The Economics ofthe Coming Spaceship Earth, Boulding posited that
humankind was "very far from having made the moral, political, and
psychological adjustments which are implied in [a] transition from
[conceiving of the earth's ecosystem as an] illimitable plane to the
closed sphere."96 As Boulding presciently explained, '" Apres nous, le
deluge' has been the motto of not insignificant numbers of human
societies" and "so let us eat, drink, spend, extract and pollute, and be as
merry as we can" and let "the problems of the future ... be left to the
future."97 After all, "'[w]hat has posterity ever done for me?",98
Before Katrina, what needed to be done and just as importantly,
what needed not to be done, stared us in the face. Yet we did little.
After Katrina, incredibly, the same appears likely to occur. No longer
does it require any leap of faith to imagine the consequences of failing
to address the human and environmental consequences of a hurricane
landing in the Gulf Coast. We have already seen it, and, as shattering
as it seemed, neither the storm nor the flooding was as destructive as
they easily could have been with just a modicum of increased bad luck.
Yet, once again, memories are quickly fading and no radical shifts in
private or governmental conduct seem likely.99 While in the near term,
"available"-that is, if the risks are familiar, vivid, and recent. Cass R. Sunstein, Precautions
Against Mat? The Availability Heuristic and Cross-Cultural Risk Perception, 57 ALA. L.
REv. 75, 87-88 (2005).
94.
See Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 92, at 555-56.
95.
See id at 556-58.
96.
Kenneth E. Boulding, The Economics of the Coming Spaceship Earth, in
KENNETH E. BOULDING ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY IN A GROWING ECONOMY

3, 4

(Henry Jarrett ed., 1966).
97. Id at 11-12.
98. Id at 11.
99.
Because of the "availability heuristic," humans are more likely to be influenced
by events that are fresh in their minds. See Noll & Krier, supra note 78, at 338. As time
passes, Katrina's impact on our thought processes will lessen. See id Indeed, in Katrina's
aftermath, the Corps of Engineers in Mississippi is proposing to issue a "regional general
permit" for projects that develop up to five acres of wetlands. Public Notice, Mobile Dist.
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the human outpouring of assistance to the victims of Katrina was
certainly welcome and stirring, such short-term concern shows little
potential for translation into longer-term, effective, and sustained
action. 100
There is instead more reason to assume that past mistakes will
now be repeated and the problem will worsen rather than improve with
further development in the Gulf Coast. 101 Rather than try to reduce the
hazards simply by giving nature space, as Oliver Houck has long
supported, we seem more likely to rely once again on levees destined
to fail. I02 We seem poised, perversely, to demonstrate our human spirit
by rebuilding in flooded areas and our resolve by restoring the
industrial, commercial, and residential activities ill-suited for those
locations. As the war against terror transfigures into the war against
Mother Nature and heeding the laws of nature becomes equated with
surrender and cowardice, the cycle of destruction and human misery
seems destined, no matter how unconscionably, to continue. City and
state officials seem ready to succumb to the temptation, just as they
did in the early twentieth century before, during, and immediately
following the Flood of 1922, to dampen down any awareness of
continuing risk and potential for further human tragedy because of the
adverse impact of such awareness on the local economy.103 They will
opt for unconditional promises of safety to lure people and, at least as
importantly, monied investors back to the community.l04
Environmental law is typically faulted for overreacting to the
catastrophe of the moment. Economists and some legal scholars
complain that environmentalists exaggerate the problem of the
moment through the "availability" of recent events and by "cascade
effects.,,105 The basic claim is that people react to problems based on
immediate emotion rather than neutral economic analysis of costs and

Corps of Eng'rs, Regional General Permit SAM-20 (Oct. 10,2006) (available at http://www.
sam.usace.anny.rnillRD/reg/PN/OctoberISAM-2006-2181-JWS.pdf).
100. See Noll & Krier, supra note 78, at 338. Research shows that in the aftermath of
an earthquake, insurance for earthquakes initially rises but eventually declines as memories of
the earthquake fade. Sunstein, supra note 93, at 88.
101. See Houck, supra note 37, at 5-8 (describing various special interest projects
contained in the "Pelican Bill," which was proposed, but not passed, in Katrina's immediate
aftermath).
102. See id at 44-54.
103. BARRY, supra note 63, at 226-27, 239-40, 341.
104. Peter Whoriskey, New Orleans Repeats Mistakes as It Rebuilds, WASH. POST, Jan.
4,2007, at AI.
105. See Sunstein, supra note 93, at 87-88, 94.
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benefits. 106 They overreact to what just happened, whether it be an oil
spill, toxic chemical spill, or the loss of a charismatic species.107 The
public is susceptible to a chemical-of-the-week phenomenon that
misdirects societal resources. The public likewise reflexively opposes
any activity that might have negative environmental impacts in their
"own backyard.,,108 The upshot of such limited temporal and spatial
horizons is excessive environmental protection regulation that imposes
unduly burdensome costs on economically valuable activities.
Katrina soberly reminds us, however, that such overreaction is not
environmental law's only or most significant problem. Environmental
law's greatest challenge may instead be to bridge the significant gap
between the laws of nature and human nature that promotes a tendency
to underreact to consequences that seem temporally and physically
distant rather than overreact to those that manifest themselves more
immediately. 109 The impact of humankind's limited temporal and
spatial horizons cuts both ways. While it may cause an overreaction to
what is happening right at the moment in one's own backyard, the
converse is also true. It is likely to result in an underreaction when
cause and effect are neither temporally nor spatially immediate. 110
There is good reason, moreover, to expect that the circumstances
that generate the potential for underreaction are those that are
increasingly present. As technology expands in scale, cause and effect
106. See POSNER, supra note 86, at 121-22; Sunstein, supra note 93, at 80-87. This
phenomenon also prompts people to believe that a likely, but not recently experienced, event
will not occur. See Noll & Krier, supra note 78, at 331; Robert 1. Rhee, Catastrophic Risk
and Govemance After Hurricane Katrina, 38 ARIz. ST. L.1. 581, 588-89 (2006).
107. See Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 1. LEGAL STUD.
1059, 1060-61 (2000).
108. See POSNER, supra note 86, at 120.
109. See id at 120-22. Humans are prone to undervalue catastrophic outcomes with
nontrivial possibilities, but overvalue catastrophic possibilities with very low probabilities.
Noll & Krier, supra note 78, at 334.
110. See Noll & Krier, supra note 78, at 331; Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversible and
Catastrophic, 91 CORNELL L. REv. 841, 871 (2006); Jeffrey Kluger, My
Wony About the
Should, TIME, Dec. 4, 2006, at 64-67
Things We Shouldn't . .. and Ignore the Things
("The problem with habituation is that it can also lead us to go to the other extreme, worrying
not too much but too little. [September] 11 and Hurricane Katrina brought calls to build
impregnable walls against such tragedies ever occurring again. But despite the vows, both
New Orleans and the nation's security apparatus remain dangerously leaky."). Professor Cass
Sunstein, a major proponent of environmental regulation's tendency to overreact to
environmental risks, has recently acknowledged that certain kinds of environmental risks may
be susceptible to being underregulated because they are effectively "offscreen." See Sunstein,
supra, at 871. His mistake in this respect is appreciating only the tendency for that to occur
for low-probability catastrophic risks and not the more general problem of such underreaction
for physically and temporally distant consequences, even if the probability of their occurrence
can no longer be fairly characterized as low probability.
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in nature are invariably spread further out in both time and space.
Humankind possesses the capacity to take actions that have adverse
environmental consequences hundreds and indeed thousands of miles
away. Humankind similarly has the technological capacity to take
actions that have environmental consequences hundreds and indeed
thousands of years from the present. Entire ecosystems can be
destroyed, resources can be entirely exhausted, and species can be
rendered extinct. Technology, in effect, allows for an exporting of the
consequences of actions from now to distant locations or distant times.
Humankind's role in producing global climate change is the
paradigmatic example. Technological developments have advanced to
the point where humankind's ability to combust fossil fuels is so great
that it results in contributions to the atmosphere of carbon dioxide and
other greenhouse gases massive enough to prompt climatic changes on
a global scale. III Yet the truly dramatic nature of such a consequence is
nonetheless effectively masked by its enormous spatial and temporal
dimensions. No one activity at one location seems discretely responsible
for particular consequences at another location. And, further muddling
the picture, the time scales supplied by nature in the context of global
climate change are such that changes in human activity now would
apparently have no effect on climate for several decades at the earliest,
long after those undertaking those changes had themselves died. The
temporal distance undermines any strong sense of personal
responsibility. It also invites the assumption that solutions to the
problem may be developed long before those predicted consequences
are to occur, and, therefore, they may not occur at all. In other words,
why act now at great personal sacrifice when it is quite possible that
further technological advances in the distant future may render such
sacrifices wholly unnecessary? The problem, of course, is that there is
no such guarantee, especially because the natural tendency to push the
problem off to a future generation makes it that much less likely that
the incentives necessary to promote such technology on a timely basis
will ever be present.
The Katrina problem is not wholly unrelated to the issue of global
climate change. Although hurricanes are themselves a classic "act of
God" in legal jargon,1l2 serious scientific studies now suggest that the
Ill. See RALPH 1. CICERONE, NAT'L COUNCIL FOR SCI. & THE ENV'T, FINDING CLIMATE
CHANGE AND BEING USEFUL 14-16 (2006). Historically, through ice ages and wanning
periods, C02 concentrations have ranged from 180 to 280 parts per million; today, this
concentration approaches 385 parts per million. Jd at 14.
112. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 37 (8th ed. 2004).
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degree and frequency of hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico is linked to
global climate change. 113 The higher the temperature near the equator
where hurricanes form, the greater the number and severity of the
hurricanes spawned. 114 And, the higher the temperature of the sea
water over which those hurricanes travel, the greater still their
severity. I IS Hurricanes literally feed off of the energy value contained
in heat captured in water. 116 Indeed, Katrina's own severity appears to
have resulted from such a natural phenomenon, because it picked up
force after departing Florida and traveled over warmer water in the
Gulf before striking Louisiana and Mississippi. This impact is only
increased because climate change will likely cause sea levels to risenot an appealing phenomenon in a region that is already below sea
level. 117
Wholly apart from any possible relationship between Katrina and
global climate change, the private and public sectors' failure to reduce
the threats each presents has similar theoretical origins. While
technology of an unprecedented scale has driven the combustion
engine underlying global climate change, unprecedented technological
developments have similarly allowed humankind to destroy the
wetlands and coastal marshes in the Mississippi Delta and beyond.
The entire ecosystem has been wholly transformed. I IS Massive federal
water projects have, in effect, altered the great Mississippi River in
substantial respects. 119 These projects have even prevented the river
from naturally altering its course in a manner that would have returned
millions of tons of sediment to the land. 120 Technology has allowed for
the construction of an illusion of an ever higher and stronger wall
capable of defeating the laws of nature, thereby inviting even greater
disaster when that wall invariably toppled. At the same time, because
the precise timing and location of when a hurricane would strike
remain necessarily uncertain, human nature tended to discount unduly
the possibility.121 Market prices failed to reflect the scientific realities
because human perceptions that form those prices persisted in their
113. CICERONE, supra note Ill, at 11.
114. /d
115. /d at 12.
116. See Houck, supra note 37, at 28.
117. /d at 26-27.
118. See Houck, supra note 39, passim (explaining how human development of the
Mississippi River Valley has transformed the entire ecosystem).
119. See, e.g., id at 16-19.
120. See Cornelia Dean, Time To Move the Mississippi, Experts Say, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 19,2006, at Fl.
121. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
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narrowly focused misapprehensions. Consequently, market prices
unwittingly promoted further and further development, in the short
term, of land and water that was, because of the laws of nature,
necessary to protect public health and welfare, as well as private
property values, over the long term.122
Katrina's overriding lessons for environmental law are accordingly
twofold. First, ecological catastrophe and human tragedy can occur
when the laws of humankind fictionalize or otherwise ignore the laws
of nature. Humankind invariably fails to anticipate adverse environmental
consequences that will in fact occur by failing to undertake necessary
preventive actions and unwittingly promoting others with actions that
afYmnatively trigger or exacerbate such hannful consequences.
Second, human nature promotes such a result when larger scales of
technology allow for the greater export of the consequences of actions
today to increasingly distant locations and times. Whether the product
of culture or biology, humankind tends to maximize welfare in the
more immediate space and the shorter term. Long-term planning
beyond the lifespan of those currently living, including even their
immediate existing or potential offspring, does not seem to come
naturally. People discount future consequences heavily, no doubt
partly because of the enormous uncertainty involved, but perhaps also
because of the absence of sufficient cognitive engagement with such
consequences. When the consequential reach of anyone community
is fairly confmed in time and space, the impact of such a cognitive
shortfall is correspondingly limited.
But, as the increasing
technological scale dramatically expands those consequences,
increasingly catastrophic and tragic impacts result. In Katrina, the
consequences were apparent to all, yet perversely destructive actions
overwhelmed any meaningful long-term preventive or remedial action.
In most respects, the same seems true for global climate change more
broadly here in the United States. Herein lies environmental law's
greatest challenge after Katrina.
II.

HUMAN NATURE AND THE NATURE OF OUR LAWMAKING
INSTITUTIONS

Katrina's central lesson is therefore disturbing. The problem is
not ignorance of the related science. Nor is it a lack of understanding
122. In addition to the psychological impacts of discounting, policy makers failed to
consider the ecological and flood protection benefits arising from wetlands protection
expenditures. See Ryan, supra note 38, at 999-1000.

HeinOnline -- 81 Tul. L. Rev. 1041 2006-2007

1042

TULANE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 81:lO19

of the kinds of laws and public investments that are now necessary to
reduce future human and ecological devastation like the nation recently
witnessed in Katrina's aftermath. 123 It would not be difficult to have a
blue ribbon committee of scientists from the National Academy of
Sciences publish a report that described with a fair amount of
consensus what locations should be free of any kind of residential
development, what locations should be free of certain types of
industrial development that place tons of toxic chemicals in
ecologically fragile areas, and what areas should be allowed, in effect,
to be recaptured by nature so as to provide natural protection from
natural forces that cannot otherwise be wished away. No doubt there
could be lots of reasonable disagreements at the margins and
considerable debate about the precise size and recipients of transfer
payments as needed to compensate those who would suffer economic
and personal hardship as the result of a transition to a land-use plan
that accounted for, rather than ignored, the laws of nature. But the
basic contours of what that plan would have to look like and the
enormous efficiencies to be obtained by paying the large short-term
redistributional costs now, rather than huge losses that occur when
disaster actually strikes, are fairly clear. Indeed, I expect that one could
save a lot of time and heartache if we skipped the commission and just
asked Professor Oliver Houck to draft a plan now based on the blue
ribbon commissions and serious academic studies completed years
ago.
What is disturbing is that the problem may well lie in our
lawmaking institutions rather than in our laws per se. Fixing the
problem is not simply a matter of changing existing laws or changing
the identity of current lawmakers, whether elected legislators or
appointed agency officials. There is a deeper reason why the laws
have fictionalized and ignored the laws of nature and why legislators
and agency officials, no matter their political stripe, have consistently
failed to secure the needed law reform. Katrina suggests to me that the
deeper reason lies in the structure of our existing lawmaking
institutions, which are inherently biased against producing the kinds of
laws or lawmakers needed for the difficult decisions presented. 124 In
123. SeeVAN HEERDEN & BRYAN, supra note 24, at 284.
124. Posner suggests that political leaders, lawyers, and others in similar fields are able
to understand complex math and science, but suffer from a "mathematics phobia" that directs
them away from scientific fields. POSNER, supra note 86, at 96-97, 200-08 (explaining that
lawyers and judges are unlikely to have science backgrounds and this phenomenon limits
legal professionals' ability to understand catastrophic risks). The result is that policy makers
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other words, existing environmental lawmaking institutions may
simply be incapable of establishing the necessary laws, and it is
therefore foolish to expect them to do so.
Katrina also casts light on the root cause of the problem.
Especially with increasing scales of technology, our lawmaking
institutions must be capable of producing environmental laws that
overcome the tendency of human nature to discount disproportionately
the consequences of human conduct that are distant rather than
immediate. When technology was more limited in its reach, the failure
to redress that tendency was naturally conf"med. But this is no longer
the case. As recent events with Katrina make starkly clear, and the
current debate about global climate change dramatically underscores,
the stakes are huge and the price of failing to undertake the necessary
changes may well be catastrophic.
Based on the Katrina experience, however, existing lawmaking
institutions seem more likely to succumb to such human tendencies
rather than to overcome them. At best, elected officials respond to the
demands of the voters whose own focus is on the near rather than the
far. 125 Voters notoriously respond to the moment-what are you doing
for me now-and generally display a lack of interest in significant
short-term economic sacrifice for the benefit of other persons (and
environmental interests) in distant places and times. 126 As long as
elected officials are primarily interested in reelection and are subject to
those voter preferences in relatively short-term election cycles, there is
little reason to suppose that the elected officials will rise above and
vote against their own reelection interests. 127 Legislators are also

are unable to take full advantage of the infonnation and opportunities that modem science
provides. See id at 96-97.
125. See Richard J. Lazarus, Congressiol111l Descent: The Demise of Deliberative
Democracy in Environmental Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 619, 680 (2006) (explaining that lawmakers
are averse to environmental protection because they easily succumb to short-term pressures
from constituents).
126. Id Voters are also generally disposed against environmental laws that decrease
current well-being in order to sustain gains in the future. Noll & Krier, supra note 78, at 342.
127. See POSNER, supra note 86, at 118-19; Richard A. Posner, Efficient Responses to
Catastrophic Risk, 6 Ou. J. INT'L L. 511, 514 (2006). Some commentators have pointed out
that voters' desires on a certain policy may change over time (because of temporal biases)
even if the objective circumstances surrounding the policy do not change. Noll & Krier,
supra note 78, at 336. In this case, an elected official will face intertemporal inconsistencies
in voters' preferences and will have to choose whether to disappoint citizens in the short or
long term. Id As Posner points out, the relatively short terms of elected officials-especially
in relation to the long-term risks society faces-provokes legislators to satisfY their
constituents' short-term preferences. See POSNER, supra note 86, at 118.
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subject to the same heuristics and cognitive distortions as the general
public. 128 And, certainly here too, Katrina does not suggest otherwise.
Nor does the political equation become any more favorable if one
considers the likelihood that elected officials may respond more
immediately to the views of those who contribute significant sums to
their campaigns than the views of voters in the abstract. 129 Quite the
opposite occurs. Those who contribute such significant sums are
presumably no less interested in a short-term return on their
investment. 130 The vast majority of contributions are based on what
they perceive the candidate can do for them in the short, not long, term
if elected. Here again, certainly the short-term election cycles promote
that perspective.
It would also seem fair to speculate that those who have large
sums of money to give are disproportionately those who are interested
in shorter-term profit maximization. Business and commercial
interests are not ignorant of the longer term, but various pressures,
including employee and corporate officer interest in higher sall:!ries
now, consumer preference for lower prices now, and shareholder
interests in higher stock values now, all contribute to an emphasis on
the shorter term and on economic return.13I To be sure, there are
wealthy campaign contributors who-once they have made especially
enormous sums in the short term and therefore have much more
money than they could ever expend on themselves and their familiespossess different, longer-term, more aspirational goals that are not so
profit driven. But there is little basis for supposing that they define the
vast majority of the largest contributors, and, in any event, the process
128. Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 92, at 572. Congress has attempted to counter
these tendencies by developing an extensive committee process to better inform members.
Id at 574-75.
129. See Lazarus, supra note 125, at 664. Natural disaster policy makers should not be
blind to concerns of equity. Because of the declining marginal utility of goods, a policy that
was geared towards protecting the poorest may also be utility maximizing. Matthew D.
Adler, Eqwty Analysis and Natural Hazards Policy, in ON RISK AND DISASTER: LESSONS
FROM HURRICANE KATRINA 129, 132 (Ronald 1. Daniels et al. eds., 2006).
General
considerations of fairness also suggest a focus on equity. Id at 134. Policies that promote
equity over efficiency are, however, not likely to be politically popular.
130. Louisiana industry successfully lobbied Louisiana politicians to view
development from a short-term perspective. See BRINKLEY, supra note 34, at 11. The
principal beneficiaries of environmental protection are often future generations, who
necessarily cannot contribute, and proponents of diffuse interests, which encounter collective
action problems when trying to advocate for environmental protection. Lazarus, supra note
125, at 664.
13!. For a discussion of the involvement of monied interests in Louisiana's
development, see Houck, supra note 37, at 16.
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of creating such contributors-initial massive short-term profit
maximization-inherently undercuts their relative subsequent impact
on the political process.
Of course, at least in theory, unelected executive branch officials
are not as exposed or responsive to short-term economic pressures as
are elected representatives of the legislative branch. But neither has
their work proved immune. As testified to by the history leading up to
Katrina, executive branch officials, whether federal, state, or local in
character, have their own channels of political accountability. Their
offices are typically led by politically appointed officials who are
ultimately responsive to the same kinds of shorter-term political
pressures applied to the legislative branch. And, the legislative branch
itself exerts great control over the executive branch both by passing the
laws the latter must implement and, less directly but no less
significantly, controlling the budget. 132 In recent years, within the
federal government, budgetary controls over the executive branch have
dramatically proliferated as individual members of the federal
legislature have increasingly micromanaged executive branch activity
to further narrow, short-term interests of their constituents. 133
With regard to Katrina, enormous political pressure was brought
to bear on the many federal, state, and local legislative and executive
branch officials who possessed decision-making authority over
development patterns in the New Orleans area. It was not the absence
of knowledge, but the absence of the necessary political constituency,
that prompted this decision making. There was apparently no
politically powerful constituency ready to support legislators and
agency officials who (1) opposed further residential and industrial
development in wetlands capable of providing natural flood protection,
(2) opposed environmentally destructive infrastructure subsidies to
existing industry, and (3) favored raising taxes as necessary to
implement a more sensible reconciliation of human aspirations for
settlement and the physical realities of the surrounding ecosystem.l 34
132. See Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 92, at 569 (discussing a public-choice
analysis of agency interaction with Congress). Congress increasingly resorts to legislating
through appropriating. See Lazarus, supra note 125, at 638.
133. Seeidat640-47.
134. See Houck, supra note 37, at 14-16. MR-GO is also a good example of this
phenomenon. See discussion supra note 43. In the 1950s, the Corps of Engineers initially
opposed the canal because cost-benefit analysis could not possibly justifY its construction.
VAN HEERDEN & BRYAN, supra note 24, at 79. Congress simply told the Corps to run the
numbers again. Id Today, the Canal is used by less than one ship per day and costs seven to
eight million dollars per year to maintain. MEMBER SCHOLARS FOR THE CrR. FOR
PROGRESSNE REFORM, supra note 24, at 14. This amounts to a subsidy of $10,000 for every
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That is why federal, state, and local legislative and agency officials not
only failed to promote a pattern of development in the area consistent
with the laws of nature, but instead promoted one that perversely made
the threats posed there even greater. I3S
While the proposition that lawmaking institutions themselves
may require reform in order to overcome tendencies of hwnan nature
might strike some as extremely radical and profoundly undemocratic,
the possibility of such reform is entirely in keeping with our nation's
existing and traditional notions of a democratic government. 136 Indeed,
the existing structure of our government is riddled with efforts to
anticipate the dangers of unchecked democracy because of concerns
about hwnan nature and its potential interference with our nation's
aspirations for a just society, including our responsibilities to future
generations. James Madison "expressly embraced the notion that what
would separate his constitution from those that had gone before it
would be a more realistic [i.e., cynical] conception ofhwnan nature."I37
As further observed by the political scientist Martin Diamond in
commenting on the version of political science embraced by the
Framers of the United States Constitution, '" [a]ncient and medieval
thought and practice were said to have failed disastrously by clinging
to illusions regarding how men ought to be. Instead, the new science
would take man as he actually is. ",138
The Framers in the late eighteenth century faced a lawmaking
challenge of enormous dimensions: "[T]o solve what was an

ship that uses the canal. Id Despite knowledge that the Canal, which has been referred to as
a "shotgun" pointed at the head of New Orleans for its ability to funnel a stonn surge from
the Gulf to New Orleans, would channel water to the city, despite public support for its
closure, the MR-GO remained open. Id at 14. A researcher from the LSU Hurricane Center,
G. Paul Kemp, called MR-GO the "'initial cause of the disaster.'" See Michael Grunwald,
Canal May Have WOJSened City's Flooding, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 2005, at A21. In accord
with the "availability heuristic," one analyst suggested that New Orleanians had more
sensational problems, such as poverty, which made wetlands restoration an inferior concern.
BRINKLEY, supra note 34, at 16.
135. It is particularly striking that, even when the federal government sought to enact
modest development restrictions or increase hurricane protection that would require state and
local spending, local government opposed the efforts because of potential political or
monetary cost. Burby, supra note 36, at 178-79.
136. See Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 92, at 570 (explaining how lawmakers have
moved power to politically autonomous units to escape electoral and budgetary pressures).
137. Jonathan R. Macey, Competing Economic l-Jews of the Constitution, 56 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 50,55 (1987).
138. Jonathan R. Macey, Cynicism and Trost in Politics and Constitutional Theory, 87
CORNELL L. REv. 280, 296 (2002) (quoting Daniel Patrick Moynihan, The '"New Science of
Politics" and the OldArt ofGovernment, 86 PuB. INT. 22, 23 (1987)).
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apparently insoluble political problem.,,139 How can one construct a
framework for government and lawmaking capable of realizing both
the nation's long-term aspirations for true greatness while addressing
the near- and short-term demands of those whose efforts had been
indispensable in the American Revolution? Their work product, in the
form of the Constitution, "purported to create a consolidated federal
government with powers sufficient to coerce obedience to national
laws ... while remaining true to the republican principles of 1776."140
What made this seemingly such an impossible tightrope to walk was
that those same republican principles, especially in the aftermath of the
American Revolution, naturally rebelled against the sheer notion of
coercive national power by leaders far removed from those they
purported to rule. 141
The federal system, and parallel state systems, deliberately make
lawmaking difficult for that very reason: to guard against the potential
for overreaction to more immediate impulses of the moment. 142 Thus,
the legislative branch is comprised of two, rather than one, chambers to
reduce the potential for impulsive lawmaking. 143 That is also why
representatives within each are elected for different terms and from
l44
differing jurisdictional boundaries. As a further guard, the President
is entitled to veto legislation, which only a supermajority of legislators
145
The Constitution provides that a
in both chambers can overcome.
President cannot serve more than two terms, partly in recognition of
the tendency of voters to reelect incumbents rather than risk an
unknown. l46 And, of course, the Constitution is likewise riddled with
limitations on democratic lawmaking designed to guard against
perceived human tendencies to rush to judgment against the criminally
accused, 147 to silence unpopular speech,148 to disrespect minority

139. JOSEPH J. ELLIS, FOUNDING BROTHERS:
(2000).

THE REVOLUTIONARY GENERATION 9

140. Id
141. Id
142. Sec THE FEDERALIST Nos. 15 (Alexander Hamilton), 10, 51 (James Madison);
Macey, supra note 138, at 296-98. These protections can be seen as counteracting heuristics
and other cognitive biases. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Structuring
Lawmaking To Reduce Cognitive Bias: A Criticall1ew, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 616,638-39
(2002).
143. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; Macey, supra note 138, at 298.
144. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2-3.
145. Id art. I, § 7.
146. Id amend. XXII, § 1.
147. Id amends. V-VI.
148. Id amend. I.
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religions,149 to impose cruel and unusual punishment against the
despised, 150 and to diminish private property rights of the few in order
to promote the interests of the many.151
Early Supreme Court precedent drew just this connection
between the Constitution and the tendency of human nature to make
poor short-term decisions. In Fletcher v. Peck, Chief Justice John
Marshall writing for the Court in 1810 emphasized ''that the framers of
the constitution viewed, with some apprehension, the violent acts
which might grow out of the feelings of the moment.,,152 According to
the Court, "the people of the United States, in adopting that
instrument, have manifested a determination to shield themselves and
their property from the effects of those sudden and strong passions to
which men are exposed.,,153
For analogous reasons, Congress has sometimes sought to limit
its own lawmaking authority to guard against majoritarian and narrowminded impulses to satisfy short-term needs at the expense of the
longer term. In the House of Representatives, a bill can be subjected
to a "closed rule," meaning that no amendments may be introduced on
the floor. 154 In that manner, Congress can decide ahead of time to
prevent the introduction of amendments, including those that members
anticipate would be approved were there a formal, up-or-down vote on
their passage. It is likely no happenstance that such rules are
considered more necessary in the House than the Senate, given that the
former are elected for extremely short terms and from much smaller
districts.
Congress has also passed formal legislation designed to
circumscribe its lawmaking authority in the future. For instance,
Congress passed the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control
Act of 1974 for the express purpose of changing internal congressional
lawmaking procedures to enhance legislative prospects for limiting
deficit spending. 155 This represents a Congressional response to the
natural tendency of individual members of Congress to vote for
additional federal expenditures in support of their own pet projects
149. Id
150. Id amend. VIII.
151. Id amend. V.
152.

10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87,137-38 (1810).

153. Id at 138.
154. See WM. HOLMES BROWN &

CHARLES W JOHNSON, HOUSE PRACTICE:
TO THE RULES, PRECEDENTS, AND PROCEDURES OF THE HOUSE § 2, at 19 (2003).

A GUIDE

155. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93344,88 Stat. 297; Lazarus, supra note 125, at 666.
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without any concern for the longer-term impacts of the federal deficit
on future generations. 156 The 1974 Budget Act was designed to address
this tendency by reducing the discretionary authority of individual
appropriations committees and the Congress overall. 157 The Act
established procedures for imposing budgetary caps applicable to each
appropriation subcommittee through passage of budget resolutions. 15s
These resolutions, while not themselves law, are procedural
prerequisites to the passage of appropriations legislation and are
binding within Congress itself. 159 They are designed to make it more
difficult for legislators to be influenced unduly by short-term
incentives to maximize current economic returns at the expense of
longer-term societal goals. l60
Another recent example is the Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Act of 1990. 161 The Act's stated purpose is "to provide a
fair process that will result in the timely closure and realignment of
military installations inside the United States.,,162 The impetus for this
special legislation was congressional realization that the spatially and
temporally limited interests of individual representatives were precluding
any kind of rational decision-making process. 163 The adverse economic
consequences to geographic areas where a military base warranted
closure were so seemingly harsh and focused that the political
processes precluded lawmakers from making necessary decisions. l64
The resulting patchwork of military bases around the nation both
wasted limited federal dollars and undermined effective and efficient
military operations. 165 Only by creating an artificially rigid and
encumbered decision-making process that allowed broader spatial and
temporal considerations (related to both budget and defense) to
dominate could a more rational decision be made. 166

156. Lazarus, supra note 125, at 666.
157. Id; Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act § 2, 88 Stat. at 288.
158. See Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act § 403, 88 Stat. at 320;
Lazarus, supra note 125, at 666.
159. See Lazarus, supra note 125, at 667.
160. See id at 667-68.
161. Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.1 0 1-51 0, div. B,
tit. XXIX, pt. A, § 2901, 104 Stat. 1808, 1808.

162. Id
163. See Kenneth R. Mayer, Closing Military Bases (Finally): Solving Collective
Dilemmas Through Delegation, 20 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 393, 396 (1995).
164. Seeid
165. Seeid
166. See id at 396-98.
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More specifically, the Act establishes a commission charged with
making recommendations regarding the identity of military bases that
should be closed or realigned. 167 The Act next creates a carefully
calibrated procedure, including initial recommendations to the
commission from the Secretary of Defense/ 68 C0I1llll1SSI0n
recommendations for presidential review, I 69 and the President's
approval in whole or in part of the commission recommendations,170
the possibility of revised commission recommendations upon
presidential disapproval,17I and fmally, allowance of congressional
disapproval by joint resolution of both chambers.172 The Act, however,
specifically imposes significant limitations on the timing of such
congressional consideration, which limits the ability of individual
members to hold lengthy hearings and debates and to introduce
amendments. I 73 The legislation provides which congressional committees
have initial jurisdiction,174 how much time they have to consider the
recommendations,175 when consideration on each chamber's floor is in
order,176 how much time (two hours) is allotted for floor debate, and
that amendments are barred.177 The joint resolution is a straight up-ordown vote on the commission recommendations as a whole. 178 While
the Act necessarily does not bar Congress from changing those
ultimately self-imposed limitations, it makes it deliberately harder for
Congress to do SO.179 It is a restraint that Congress plainly welcomes
because it deliberately limits their own perceived accountability for
decisions that are greatly unpopular in the short term. 180
The proposition that our lawmaking institutions may require
significant reform in light of our now enhanced understanding of the
interactions of human nature with modem technology is simply a more
recent iteration of this same theme. Just as the Framers fashioned our
nation's constitutional framework based on their perceptions of the
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act § 2902(a).
Jd § 2903(c).
Jd § 2903(d).
Jd § 2903(e).
Jd § 2903(e)(3).
Jd § 2904(b).
Jd §§ 2903(b), 2908.
Jd § 2908(b).
Jd § 2908(c).
Jd § 2908(d)(1).
Jd § 2908(d)(2).
Jd § 2908(d)(3).
See Mayer, supmnote 163, at 394-95.
Jd at 397-98, 405-06.

HeinOnline -- 81 Tul. L. Rev. 1050 2006-2007

2007]

ENVIRONMENTAL LA W AFTER KATRINA

1051

possible adverse consequences of the tendencies of human nature and
the corresponding need of government to overcome such tendencies,
so too can refonn of our modem administrative state be justified. lSI To
the extent that we now have reason to appreciate better the challenges
presented by the mismatch between the spatial and temporal reach of
modem technology and the tendency of human nature to
underestimate the related consequences, we may need lawmaking
institutions deliberately designed to fill that gap. And, just as
recognized by laws ranging from the Constitution itself to the Defense
Base Closure and Realignment Act, the necessary lawmaking institutions
may sometimes require some immunization from the inevitable
political pressures created by more short-tenn and narrow interests.
Indeed, Louisiana has already begun to take fonnal steps to
accomplish this kind of refonn. Governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco
created, by Executive Order, the Louisiana Recovery Authority (LRA)
to plan for the recovery and rebuilding of Louisiana, and the Louisiana
Legislature followed up with detailed authorizing legislation. ls2 By
statute, the LRA is charged with working with federal, state, and local
agencies to coordinate both short- and long-tenn planning. ls3 Its
members are appointed by the governor, subject to contmnation by the
state Senate. l84 They must be representative of the state based on a
number of factors. ISS The LRA possesses considerable authority over a
host of significant issues, including the disbursement of hundreds of
millions of dollars of recovery funds. ls6 Its leadership includes highly
regarded and accomplished luminaries with Louisiana roots. IS7 This
approach creates a novel kind of lawmaking body that is removed from
some of the nonnal hurly burly of the political process. The apparent
hope is that such an institution might be more effective in addressing
the compelling problems faced, including making the necessary
sensitive political tradeoffs.
Katrina raises the question whether institutional lawmaking
refonn of a fundamental nature is generally warranted for the
achievement of necessary environmental protection. At the very least,
See supra notes 143-151 and accompanying text.
182. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 36:4(H), 49:220.1-.7 (Supp. 2007); La. Exec. Order

181.

No. KBB 2005-63 (Oct. 17,2005).
183. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 49:220.5(A)(1).
184. See§ 49:220-4(B).

185. Id
186. Id § 49:220.5.
187. See La. Recovery Auth., Board of Directors, http://www.1ra.1ouisiana.govlboard.
html (last visited Mar. 11, 2007).
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Katrina should require us to seriously consider the possibility. More
than sufficient grounds exist for suspecting that something somewhere
must be broken when current lawmaking institutions have proven
incapable of securing the law reform needed even when, as was true
for Katrina, the relevant facts demonstrating the overwhelming need
for such reform were so apparent for so long. When, moreover,
hurricanes like Katrina are not an isolated once-in-a-lifetime event, but
there is instead reason to worry about the beginning of a series of such
potential catastrophes in response to humankind's manipulation of the
natural environment, the need for such a rethinking is especially
compelling.
What precise lawmaking reforms are necessary is beyond the
scope of this particular contribution, which seeks merely to initiate
rather than conclude what is quickly becoming an overdue
conversation. But a few preliminary matters do seem clear. We need
more than just a new statute, regulatory program, or plan. The
lawmaking institutions themselves, as well as the related process for
selecting those with lawmaking authority within those institutions,
must change. For as long as we have environmental lawmaking
institutions, structures, and processes "that fail to acknowledge the
threat posed by illusions of judgment, and to employ measures that
counteract human cognitive limitations," the kind of catastrophic
human and environmental devastation witnessed in Katrina is destined
to recur. 188
To be sure, some of the problems currently suffered by
environmental lawmaking are not wholly unique to environmental law.
The undermining of important social policies by short-term rent
seeking is endemic to our nation's lawmaking in general. Whether or
not one broadly subscribes to the dismal view of politics and
lawmaking advanced by public-choice theorists l89 (which I do not), it
cannot be gainsaid that our lawmaking institutions are too often
influenced and sometimes even dominated by those whose behavior
could best be explained in those terms. For this reason, the need for
widespread and dramatic campaign finance reform is, without
question, a root cause of much of what does not currently work well,
and environmental law is, within that broader context, simply yet
188. See Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 92, at 571.
189. See, e.g., id at 551; Edward L. Rubin, Public Choice, Phenomenology, and the
Meaning ofthe Modem State: Keep the Bathwater, but Throw Out That Baby, 87 CORNELL
L. REv. 309, 343 (2002) (arguing that sanctions are necessary to ensure people comply with
the requirements of governmental programs).
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another manifestation of the problem. So too, current problems with
environmental lawmaking can be traced to the broader structural
problems created by federal and state legislative processes that allow,
or at least fail to discourage, monied interests from securing legislative
riders that would never pass muster on their own merits, but sail
through once attached to otherwise-compelling legislation.
The demands for better environmental lawmaking, however,
cannot patiently wait for those kinds of broader lawmaking reforms to
occur. If the challenges to environmental lawmaking highlighted by
Katrina prompt the reforming of current lawmaking institutions or the
creation of new ones, environmental law can lead by example.
Environmental law can demonstrate how innovations in lawmaking
institutions and decision-making processes can overcome the tendency
of human nature to discount unduly certain kinds of risk, and the
related exploitation of that tendency by our current political and
lawmaking systems. If those innovations prove successful, they can be
adapted, as appropriate, and applied to other areas of lawmaking as
well.
We now most need not another report by scientific experts on the
science of flood control and land use development by the National
Academy of Sciences. What instead seems more apt and pressing is a
report by the nation's foremost experts on governance and political
science under the auspices of the National Academy of Public
Administration. We need our best minds to take up the challenge on
how best to create a lawmaking process consistent with our democratic
traditions and capable of effectively addressing the enormous
environmental risks that Katrina reminds us are now increasingly in
play.
ill. KNOWING THY ENEMY

The political advertisement in the New lVrk Times described at
the outset purports to identify the "enemy" and then offers a policy
prescription for "fighting back": federal government reinsurance to
compensate for residential property losses up to $200 billion for those
who suffer damage from hurricanes, tornados, and earthquakes and
cannot be fully covered by otherwise-available private or state
insurance. 190 But instead of proffering a sound public policy solution,
the advertisement unwittingly illustrates the challenges that we now
face as a nation.
190. ProtectingAmerica.org, supra note 1; see H.R. 4366, 109th Congo § 2 (2005).
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The advertisement's sponsors tap into human nature's preference
to see stark choices between "good" and "evil" and to embrace shortterm solutions that offer compensation rather than longer-term change
that might entail some self sacrifice. 191 Mother Nature accordingly
becomes, in practical effect, al-Qaeda: '5411 enemy that has no
govemment, no money traJl and no qualms about killing women and
ch11dren.,,192 The sponsor of the advertisement asserts that Mother
Nature "killed" people, "devastated" hundreds of square miles, and
"caused over 100 billion dollars worth of destruction."193 "Even when
her wrath isn't as grand," the advertisement continues, "she is still
accountable every year for almost 500 American deaths and 14 billion
dollars worth of damage.,,194
To counter this enemy, we must "start[] fighting back.,,195
ProtectingAmerica.org, moreover, becomes equated with providing
federally subsidized reinsurance to make it easier to build back in
those areas that Katrina destroyed. 196 A failure to provide such a
federal subsidy is presumably the policy equivalent of a retreat or even
societal cowardice in the face of a brutal, menacing enemy.
Wholly missing, however, is acknowledgment of the reason why
the private market or state reinsurance, standing alone, cannot provide
the coverage necessary to overcome the disincentives that people
would otherwise inevitably have for placing their lives and their
livelihoods in the path of future destructive storms. There is an
insufficient private market because the true cost of such reinsurance,
given the actual risks presented, would be prohibitively high. Nor are
the states willing to pick up the tab. Only by masking those actual
risks through government subsidies, in the form of a federal
reinsurance program, can the irrational and tragic development
patterns that existed prior to Katrina perversely recur.
To be sure, there are instances when market failure may warrant a
government subsidy that corrects the failure by restoring accurate
incentives. With regard to insurance and reinsurance, in particular,
191. "Reinsurance" is, in effect, insurance for insurance companies that allows them to .
cap their losses and provides an alternative source of funds for losses that exceed certain
catastrophic amounts. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 112, at 1312.
192. ProtectingAmerica.org, supra note 1.
193.
194.

Id
Id

195.
196.

See ProtectingAmcrica.org, http://www.protcctingamerica.org (last visited Mar.

This is probably a vast understatement given that Mother Nature might
presumably be accused of causing the deaths of all who die of "natural causes;' including old
age and its many proxies.

Id

11,2007).
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private market participants may argue that they are unable to offer
insurance for low probability events that, when realized, have huge
catastrophic consequences. 197 Their contention is that it takes many
years to capture the premiums necessary to create the reserves required
for a payout if the catastrophe strikes, yet that event could happen
before the necessary reserves are created. 198
No doubt there are many circumstances when a government
subsidy is warranted not to further efficiency goals, but because a
collective decision of other important societal goals warrants
promotion regardless of their apparent short-term inefficiencies.
Precisely because those other goals are unrelated to economic
efficiency, society cannot rely on free market forces for their
accomplishment.
Understandably, few short-term, economicefficiency questions are posed when the nation responds to a threat to
its national security or to the plight of victims of a natural disaster.
But neither such circumstance is present here. Private market
failure in the reinsurance industry is not the primary reason for any
possible lack of adequate incentives to rebuild in certain threatened
areas in the Gulf Coast. The more likely cause has been the very kind
of more perfect information upon which free market forces are
supposed to attend. At least in the immediate aftermath of Katrina,
before memories began to fade over time and the inevitable
disproportionate discounting of risk over time occurs, individuals will
properly take into account the risks of development in ecologically
fragile areas susceptible to flooding. The illusions of impregnable
levees are fresh. So too are the real world repercussions of decades of
destroying thousands of acres of wetlands and of constructing barriers
that prevent the Mississippi River from depositing millions of tons of
sediment each year. The federal reinsurance program is more akin to a
subsidy to overcome the economic disincentives naturally created by
that information than a boost designed to promote economically
efficient decisions. Even though the initial proposal may suggest that
insurance premiums must be "sufficient to pay the expected
annualized cost" of coverage, it does not require much imagination to
speculate how such a program, once in place, will naturally evolve
over time. 199 Similar to the history of implementation of federal flood
197. See Jeffrey R. Brown et ai., An Empirical Analysis of the Economic Impact of

Federal Terrorism Reinsurance, 51 J. MONETARY ECON. 861, 866-67 (2004).
198. See id at 865-67. Indeed, Katrina was the costliest American catastrophe, with
insurance losses estimated at $34.4 billion. Rhee, supra note 106, at 591.
199. See H.R. 4366, 109th Congo § 7(b)(6)(A)(iii)(2005).
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insurance programs, once private economic expectations begin to
harden and form political constituencies, the federal reinsurance
program will inevitably become riddled with special interest
Terms like
exceptions and fictional regulatory definitions. 2°O
"sufficient" and "costs" will denote one thing but provide another,
allowing the programs to operate as a subsidy in practical effect.
Government-supplied insurance subsidies will result in the
amplification, rather than the minimization, of natural catastrophic
risk. The promise of government to bailout property owners when a
catastrophe occurs effectively encourages development in risky
areas. 201 There are few clear winners. The development is itself likely
to lead to increased injury because of the removal of nature's own
protections. The property owners whose lives and livelihoods are
destroyed receive compensation, but compensation that is unlikely to
compensate them fully for the hardships they suffer, let alone the
injuries of those around them who suffer vicariously. And, of course,
the taxpayers lose because of the enormous sums that have to be paid
out to the victims. Only the insurance companies may come out ahead,
still able to make a profit while protected against huge losses by the
promise of a federal reinsurance bailoueo2
Nor, notwithstanding the advertisement's not-so-veiled efforts to
the contrary, is the supposed call to arms against Mother Nature even a
remote cousin to the kind of compelling circumstance present when, as
in the aftermath of September II th, the nation must respond to a
terrorist attack by taxpayer-supported governmental action without any
assumption that private market forces will somehow forge the
necessary response. Yes, in the immediate aftermath of Katrina, the
nation should, as it did, spend substantial resources to redress the needs
of Katrina's victims. Those types of payments to victims in distress
define the kind of society and nation we strive to be. Indeed, the
government likely should have spent more than it did in light of its
complicity in the construction of levees and the development patterns
that increased the resulting damage.
But, government subsidies to redress past mistakes are a far cry
from a call for further subsidies that seem destined to repeat those
same mistakes and cause further misery and destruction that no kind
of compensation can ever make whole. For each kind of subsidy, there
200. See Houck, supmnote 37, at 22-23; Rhee, supmnote 106, at 599-600.
See Rhee, supm note 106, at 598, 602. Because of this government subsidy,
property owners have a reduced incentive to take efforts to mitigate risk. Id
202. Mowbray, supmnote 3.
201.
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may well be a moral imperative. The stark difference is that in the
former situation, it supports the subsidy, yet in the latter cases, it may
well require the subsidy's rejection.
In a related insurance context, Louisiana officials have recently
taken what seems like a bold step in a positive direction. The
Governor rejected the kind of approach embraced by the State of
Florida, which increased the upper limit of the state's liability under its
insurance program and thereby "makes it attractive for people to call
their very own dangerous piece of hurricane alley home-much to the
delight of developers.,,203 The Louisiana Governor's declared approach
is to lower insurance rates by seeking to lower the amount of damage
caused by hurricanes by imposing more stringent building codes,
adopting sounder flood control policies, and providing citizens with
tax incentives that promote steps to limit hurricane damage to
residences. As was well described by a recent Washington Post
editorial: "That's the best kind of insurance reform.,,204
New Orleans and the Gulf Coast have extraordinarily rich
environmental and cultural histories. The region is literally the mixing
bowl of the Mississippi River and the Gulf of Mexico, forming an
ecologically rich and dynamic combination of land, water, and plant
and animal life. Approximately 40% of the country's water, extending
to thirty-one states, drains into the Mississippi River, which in tum
flows down to the Gulf.20S Driven together by the same forces of
nature, the region has witnessed a remarkable blending of cultures
producing its own remarkable style. Originally inhabited by Native
Americans, the region early on witnessed waves of settlers from
France, Spain, Acadia, England, Germany, the West Indies, Africa,
Ireland, Italy, Yugoslavia, and Hungary, among other nations. 206 New
Orleans feels different than the rest of the nation, with its parishes and
Napoleonic Code-influenced civil law traditions, which is also why so
many people throughout both the United States and the world have
such a profound sense of loss at its threatening. The City of New
Orleans, extending to its surrounding area, is its own distinct species
full of historic and cultural richness, and it would be irreplaceable if it
were lost.
203. Editorial, Lowsiana's Better Bet· GoY. Blanco Is Not Willing To Fool with
Mother Nature, WASH. POST, Mar. 24, 2007, at A16.
204. Id
205. BARRY, supra note 63, at 21.
206. See Arnold R. Hirsch & Joseph Logsdon, The People and Culture of New
Orleans, NEW ORLEANS ONLINE.COM, http://www.neworleansonline.comlneworleanslhistory/
people.html (last visited Mar. II, 2007).
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Perhaps that same remarkable blending of nature and culture can
now, in Katrina's wake, help produce a new way to think about
lawmaking, at least for environmental law. After all, innovation in
lawmaking is, in many respects, what made this nation great at its
founding and what has maintained its greatness ever since. The
Framers established a system of government that has proven
sustainable over time by embracing a creative combination of
democratic and republican theories of government, while accounting
for both the possible positive and negative tendencies of human nature.
It was an extraordinary innovation that has proven remarkably stable
for more than two centuries, partly because its genius included the
potential for further innovation over time in light of changing
circumstances. What Katrina teaches is that the combination of the
laws of nature and human nature may now require just such
institutional innovation. Environmental law after Katrina may well
require no less than new approaches to making environmental law.
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